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Radical Contextuality in Heidegger’s Postmetaphysics: 




1. Being: From Ontotheological Universality to Transitional Singularity 
In his Postmetaphysical Thinking (1988), Jürgen Habermas describes “radical contextualism” as the defining 
mark of “postmodern” thought and as a “manifestation of the spirit of the times.”1 Indeed, the theme of 
the radical contextuality of meaning is common to a wide variety of contemporary philosophical 
orientations from hermeneutics, structuralism, poststructuralism, and deconstruction to the “ordinary 
language philosophy” rooted in the later Wittgenstein. As opposed to the classical Platonic and 
Aristotelian model of the ideality and permanence of the meanings expressed and communicated through 
material language, the many variants of the radical contextual approach typically hold that linguistic and 
discursive meaning is itself context-sensitive and generated in the dynamic and holistic frameworks of 
different historical languages, cultures, and discursive practices. 
In what follows, it will be argued that a certain type of radical contextuality is a key topic of 
Heidegger’s thinking.2 Heidegger’s “contextualism,” it must be added, is of a particular kind. It concerns 
being as such, in the broad phenomenological sense of the intelligible or meaningful givenness of things 
corresponding to human openness or receptivity to this givenness.3 In keeping with Heidegger’s historical 
self-interpretation, his position can indeed be designated as “postmetaphysical” in the sense that it calls 
into question some of the most fundamental presuppositions of the Western metaphysical tradition, the 
paradigmatic structure of which Heidegger discovers in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.  
For the Aristotelian metaphysical approach, the fundamental problem inherent in the term “being” 
(to on, ens) is its extreme universality. In scholastic terminology, being is a “transcendental” notion, that 
is, one that transcends the most general kinds of things but is not itself a definable kind or genus.4 Being 
pertains to particular instances of “to be” in different senses that are irreducible to any common 
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definition. For Aristotle, however, this does not make “to be” a merely equivocal expression. Everything 
that is said to “be,” in one sense or another, does share a common point of reference, which eventually 
turns out to be an exemplary sense of “to be”: ousia, substantiality or Entity, that is, the being-ness of a 
determinate particular entity.5 As opposed to particular material and spatiotemporally situated entities 
that are implicated in the potentiality and contingency of matter, the supreme and perfect entity that 
serves as an ideal reference point for all others is a completely actualized, simple, and constant being: the 
metaphysical divinity (theos), whose being, Aristotle argues, consists in the absolutely self-sufficient 
activity of pure intuitive self-awareness, thought thinking itself (noēsis noēseōs).6 The greatest part of 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics thus turns out to be a preparation for the conclusion that the pursued science of 
being qua being (ontology) is, in fact, achievable only in the form of theology, of the study of the supreme 
kind of entity.7  
Settling the question of being by referring to a supreme instance of “to be” is what the later 
Heidegger designates as the “ontotheological” constitution of Aristotelian metaphysics. This he finds at 
work already in Plato’s account of the Idea of the Good as the supreme Idea.8 In Heidegger’s historical 
narrative, the hierarchical ontotheological model has fundamentally dominated Western metaphysics 
through medieval Aristotelianism and the modern, post-Cartesian metaphysics of the subject, which 
relocated the metaphysical Archimedean point from the transcendence of divine self-awareness into the 
immanent self-awareness of the thinking ego. For Heidegger, the proper culmination of modern 
metaphysics is Nietzsche. In thinking subjectivity as life and as will to power, that is, as a non-teleological 
and self-referential movement of self-enhancement in which subjectivity imposes temporary and 
instrumental “values” upon an inherently valueless and meaningless reality, Nietzsche produced an 
“inverted Platonism,” a “negative ontotheology” that unfolded the final implicit possibilities of the 
metaphysical tradition and thus exhausted its basic conceptual resources.9 This exhaustion makes possible 
the radical reconsideration of the pre-Socratic “first inception” (der erste Anfang) of metaphysical 
thought—a reconsideration that Heidegger, in his later thought, describes as an emerging “transition” 
(Übergang) from the end of metaphysics into “the other inception” (der andere Anfang) of Western 
thought.10  
This transition is most comprehensively traced out in Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, written 
between 1936 and 1938. The transition is, of course, an immensely multifaceted process that Heidegger 
never exhaustively systematized. Heidegger is mostly content with tentatively pointing out individual 
aspects of the transition. We will see that a central aspect of this process is the move from the Aristotelian-
scholastic understanding of the transcendental universality of being to a postmetaphysical perspective on 
the singularity of being, or rather, on being as singularization—as a spatiotemporal instantiation that is 
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never “the same” in two different instants, but rather renders every instance “of” being intelligible as a 
unique constellation of meaningful presence.  
 
2. Being as Singularization: Heidegger’s “Last Word”  
As Reiner Schürmann puts it, the singular event of being, which Heidegger thought in correlation with 
the singular “there” (Da) of openness, is the “other” of the ontological tradition. The singular, Schürmann 
concludes, is Heidegger’s “penultimate” word and his last word is, accordingly, “singularization.”11 The 
fact that this “last word” has attracted relatively little attention in Heidegger scholarship is at least partly 
due to the experimental and tentative character of Heidegger’s relevant formulations.12 The uniqueness 
(Einzigkeit) and singularity (Einmaligkeit) of being are perhaps most clearly indicated in the following 
passages from Contributions and the subsequent treatise Mindfulness: 
 
Within the realm of the leading question [that is, the Aristotelian metaphysical question concerning 
being qua being], . . . the essentiality of essence [Wesen] consists in the greatest possible generality. 
. . . On the other hand, when beyng [Seyn] is grasped as event [Ereignis], essentiality is determined 
in terms of the primordiality and uniqueness [Einzigkeit] of beyng itself. The essence is not the 
general but, rather, precisely the abidance [Wesung] of uniqueness in each instant.13 
 
The uniqueness and singularity [Einmaligkeit] of beyng are not properties attributed to beyng or 
even deduced determinations. . . . Rather, beyng itself is uniqueness, is singularity.14  
 
Even though the singularity of being does not explicitly emerge as a theme in Heidegger’s work until the 
mid-1930s, formulations foreshadowing this topic can be found in texts from the very outset of his 
philosophical career. In a 1915 trial lecture on the concept of time in the science of history, echoing the 
Baden Neo-Kantians, Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, Heidegger calls for a radically 
“individualizing” historical science, the goal of which would be to “depict the context of the effects and 
development of the objectifications of human life in the uniqueness [Einzigartigkeit] and singularity 
[Einmaligkeit] of these objectifications.”15 In Heidegger’s early work, however, the problem of giving an 
account of the historical situatedness of singular lived situations is not addressed simply as a problem for 
the methodology of historical science. It is already meant as a challenge to the entire philosophical 
tradition. In 1923, Heidegger announced the task of elaborating a radicalized ontology—a new approach 
to the question of being as such—by way of a “hermeneutics of facticity,” that is, a radically interpretive 
phenomenology of concrete lived experience in its context-specific and situated character.16 This task of 
elaborating a new fundamental ontology of situatedness set the course for Being and Time. In a structural 
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analogy with Aristotle’s metaphysics, fundamental ontology was to articulate the meaning or sense (Sinn) 
of being as such, that is, the basic structural precondition for meaningfulness in general, by way of an 
analysis of an “exemplary being,” an outstanding instance of being.17 The exemplary being of fundamental 
ontology is, however, fundamentally different from the Aristotelian God. It is precisely the mortal and 
finite human Dasein that is “exemplary” simply in the sense that it is characterized by an understanding 
openness to meaning, thus providing the receptive there for any meaningful being-there.18  
The first stage of fundamental ontology, the analytic of Dasein, aims at disclosing temporal 
situatedness—Dasein’s temporality or “timeliness” (Zeitlichkeit)—as the basic structure of Dasein’s 
“caring,” that is, purpose- and meaning-oriented, existence. After a preparatory analysis of the different 
categories or modes of existence, the existentials, these existentials are referred back to three temporal 
ecstases, that is, three dynamic aspects or vectors of Dasein’s unitary temporal happening 
(“temporalization,” Zeitigung) as contextual and situated.19 In terms of the ecstasis of futurity or 
“forthcoming” (Zukunft), Dasein “comes forth to itself” from its open futural possibilities by grasping 
the fact that it has always already come to be in a specific situation (the ecstasis of “already having been,” 
Gewesenheit) in terms of the finite possibilities orienting this precise situation.20 On the basis of this initial 
temporal contextuality, Dasein is receptive to the concerns of the present (Gegenwart), the ecstasis through 
which the things of the world are primordially given as meaningful in a practical world-context (readiness-
to-hand or availability, Zuhandenheit). Things are available within a temporally multidimensional network 
of references to practical possibilities and existing practices. Contrary to the “vulgar” linear representation 
of time as a succession of now-points, the three ecstases in their reciprocal interplay are essentially 
“contemporaneous” (gleichzeitig), in the sense that they form a unitary, although complex, process of 
contextual meaning generation. As Heidegger puts it in his 1936 Schelling lectures, this “at once” (Zumal) 
of the three ecstases is “the singular uniqueness [einmalige Einzigkeit] of the inexhaustible fullness of 
timeliness [Zeitlichkeit] itself.”21 
The most “authentic” or “proper” (eigentlich), that is, ontologically most primordial, mode of 
temporal existence is the primarily future-oriented resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) in which Dasein is released 
from its ordinarily exclusive immersion in present concerns to experience the full temporal dimensionality 
of its own being.22 The ecstasis of the present is thereby singularized into an instant (Augenblick),23 an 
instantaneous “glance of the eye” into the unique context-specificity of one’s singular situation and into 
the situated, processual identity of Dasein as “in each instance mine” (je meines).24 In brief, in the instant, 
Dasein grasps a singular constellation of meaningfulness in its temporally constituted singularity and its 
own receptivity to such singularity. As Heidegger puts it his 1924–25 lecture course, the instant is “catching 
sight of the just‐this‐once [Diesmaligen], of the concrete singularity [Diesmaligkeit] of the instantaneous situation 
[augenblicklichen Lage].”25 In the 1929–30 lectures, the instant is described as what “properly makes Dasein 
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possible. . . . This instant is the look of the resoluteness of Dasein for being-the-there [Da-sein], the being-
the-there that, in each instance [je], is in such a way that it exists in the situation it has unreservedly seized 
upon, an existing which is in each instance singular [einmalige] and unique [einzige].26  
Fundamental ontology seeks a path from Dasein’s timeliness to the temporality (Temporalität) of 
being as such, that is, to the contextual singularity of the givenness of meaningful presence. Heidegger’s 
potentially misleading characterizations of the disclosure of being as a “transcendental cognition” and of 
being as the “transcendens pure and simple” are modified by the following remark: “The transcendence of 
the being of Dasein is a distinctive one since in it lies the possibility and necessity of the most radical 
individuation.”27 Being is “transcendental,” no longer in the scholastic sense of that which is most universal 
and transcends all limited determinations, but rather in the sense of the contextualizing horizon that 
transcends simple and immediate presence and, in its structural correlation with Dasein’s temporally 
contextual receptivity to meaning, “gives” meaningful presence as singular.28 
The completion of fundamental ontology would ultimately have required a turn or reversal (Kehre) 
in its initial approach, a turning back to reconsider Dasein on the basis of the temporal sense of being, in 
order to render visible the reciprocity of the structural correlation between being and Dasein.29 Already 
in Being and Time, Heidegger points out that Dasein is the point from which fundamental ontology sets 
out and to which it must again revert (zurückschlagen).30 Furthermore, in 1928 Heidegger explicitly 
announces that after the completion of the temporal analytic, fundamental ontology is to undergo a 
conversion into a “metontology” or “metaphysical ontic,” that is, a “post-ontology” or “reverse 
ontology” in which beings are to be approached again in terms of an explication of the sense of being.31 
This turn or conversion was to be accomplished in the missing Division I.3 of Being and Time, “Time and 
Being.” It turned out, however, to be unfeasible within the conceptual framework of fundamental 
ontology, which Heidegger eventually deemed to be too deeply anchored in traditional terminology.32 
During the early 1930s, Heidegger therefore concentrates his efforts on developing his discourse with 
the help of “reversed” expressions. Most conspicuously, fundamental ontology’s vocabulary of going 
outside and beyond—existence, ecstasis, and transcendence, terms that could still be construed as implying an 
outset in a self-immanent subjectivity that is only subsequently exceeded—is replaced by a vocabulary of 
entering and remaining within. The seemingly converse turn from designating Dasein’s mode of being as 
“existence” (Existenz, literally, “standing out”) to “insistency” (Inständigkeit, literally, “standing in”) in the 
“there” shifts the emphasis to the fact that the singular and situated disclosure of being in specific beings 
is “entered” from a preceding, singularizing background context and not vice versa.33  
An “instant” of meaningful presence is thus literally a “standing within” (Latin: in-stans) a specific 
meaning-context. On the other hand, Heidegger now reconsiders the development of the metaphysical 
tradition in the light of a deepened perspective on the historicity of being itself. The various epochs in 
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the metaphysical tradition are now regarded as articulations of the respective experiences of being in its 
historically situated configurations. The transitional experience of being as singularization is not 
presented as a genial insight into some underlying suprahistorical truth that was “there” all along. This 
experience is, rather, a new instant—Heidegger presents it, at this point, as a pure possibility—in which 
the entire tradition from which it has emerged would gain a transformed meaning.34 
The fruit of these reconsiderations is Contributions to Philosophy, which looks at the postmetaphysical 
transitional situation with a view to an emerging possibility of thinking, namely, articulating being 
postmetaphysically as event (Ereignis). As its parenthesized subtitle, Vom Ereignis—literally of or from the 
event—emphasizes, being is no longer approached by way of the exemplary receptive being, Dasein. 
Rather, the point of departure is the event of being itself in the sense of the reciprocal correlation between 
the contextual givenness of meaning and Dasein, which is no longer simply identified with human being 
as such but rather understood as a determinate possibility of human being.35 Heidegger’s textual strategy 
in Contributions is to emphasize the difference between the transitional approach to being as singularization 
and the traditional metaphysical notion of being as extreme universality by designating the former with 
the obsolete German orthography Seyn, translated into English as “beyng” or “beying,” and the latter 
with Sein.36 Ereignis, the title for the basic dynamic character of Seyn, is the event or the “taking place” of 
historical singularity in which meaningful presence “finds its place,” in other words, is contextualized and 
situated within the “instantaneous site” (Augenblicksstätte) of spatiotemporal situatedness (Zeit-Raum) 
furnished by Dasein. As a situated site of the event of meaningful presence, Dasein “corresponds to the 
uniqueness of beyng as event [Ereignis].”37 As Heidegger later notes, he uses the word Ereignis as a singulare 
tantum, a noun (like wine or sugar) singular by definition: Ereignis is not a general term comprehending a 
multiplicity of single events, but rather refers to the singularization of the singular as such.38 
 
3. The Fourfold Contextuality of Singular Presence 
The topics of radical contextuality and singularization are particularly relevant for understanding the 
purpose of one of the most important and most enigmatic figures of Heidegger’s later thought: the 
fourfold, first introduced in its definitive form in the 1949 Bremen lecture on “The Thing” and reappearing 
in texts of the 1950s.39 The fourfold is a model consisting of two pairs—sky (Himmel) and earth (Erde), 
divinities (die Göttlichen) and mortals (die Sterblichen)—intersecting in a “onefold of four,” in the 
complicated unity of a singular thing. This can be seen as Heidegger’s most ambitious articulation of 
being as the event of the contextual singularization of the meaningful presence of things to the human 
being.40 As Graham Harman points out, the primary weakness of the fourfold is the fact that Heidegger 
never adequately links it to the rest of his project; it rather “seems to drop magically from the clouds.”41 
Heidegger did, however, apparently incubate the figure for a long time, only to leave it more or less 
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embryonic. An early diagram of the fourfold can be found already in Contributions.42 In the lectures of the 
same period, notably the 1934–35 Hölderlin course,43 Introduction to Metaphysics (1935),44 and “The Origin 
of the Work of Art (1935–36),”45 Heidegger develops related models.46 It appears that at this point 
Heidegger had begun to consider the three-dimensional ecstatic temporal model of Being and Time an 
insufficient account of the contextuality involved in a singular meaningful situation.  
Jean-François Mattéi has interestingly suggested a structural analogy between Heidegger’s fourfold 
and the Aristotelian doctrine of the four causes.47 This approach is all the more compelling since 
Heidegger, in “On the Essence of Ground” (1929), explicitly connects the three temporal ecstases, as 
three modes of providing “grounds” for a meaningful situation, to the traditional metaphysical question 
concerning the fundamental kinds of reasons or causes. In this text, Heidegger also points to the lack of 
unity and ultimate justification of the four Aristotelian causes. He adds, however, that there is “an 
unmistakable orientation toward illuminating ground in general in an originary manner” in Aristotle, who 
“was not content merely to list the ‘four causes’ alongside one another, but was concerned with 
understanding their interconnection and the grounding of this fourfold division.”48 The Aristotelian 
causes articulate different factors that account for the presence of a particular material entity, making it 
warranted and comprehensible; they are different types of answer to the question, “Why (this, rather than 
something else)?”49 For Heidegger, the fourfold clearly has an analogous function: it articulates the basic 
structure of the multidimensional context that individuates and singularizes a thing as a situated instance 
of meaningful presence.  
This should not, of course, mask the profound differences between the two fourfold models. For 
Aristotle, a thing is an ontologically independent and (relatively) self-sufficient entity; its “causes” are 
either aspects of its intrinsic ontological structure (form and matter) or other entities (its originator, such 
as its producer, and the final cause, ultimately divine perfection) to which it stands in an extrinsic 
relationship.50 In the 1949 Bremen lectures and the associated 1953 lecture, “The Question Concerning 
Technology,” Heidegger maintains that the Aristotelian doctrine of the four causes is fundamentally 
related to the process of production (poiēsis), which, he insists, provides the basic ontological model for 
Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics. In his view, Plato and Aristotle basically articulate entities as 
products, that is, as particular implementations of an ideal prototype.51 By contrast, as is clear already from 
Being and Time, the Heideggerian model first and foremost applies to things as they are encountered in the 
context of concernful dealings, of use and employment. In this model, a thing as a singular focal point of 
meaningfulness is nothing but a “onefold of four,” in other words, a temporary intersection of four 
dimensions involved in a practical situation.52 These dimensions are not things or entities in their own 
right.53 They are merely evoked and referred to and thereby “employed,” in the literal meaning of the 
German dingen (“to hire,” “to employ”): engaged, gathered, enfolded in and by the thing, and thus 
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“present” only indirectly as references or orientations, in and through their “employment.”54 The focal 
point of a practice and the practical context it focalizes are not two separate relata of an extrinsic relation. 
Rather, they presuppose each other and are intelligible only in terms of their reciprocal interplay.  
The basic phenomenological function of the fourfold can be illustrated with the help of a simple 
and concrete example. The fundamental Platonic orientation of philosophical inquiry toward the realm 
of ideas is motivated by the insight that any concrete and particular spatiotemporal thing is, to a certain 
extent, in each instant singular.55 My desk, for example, is never exactly identical in two different instants. 
What does persist as identical is its specific whatness, that is, its ideal desk-ness; its numerical self-identity 
(its being this desk and no other) is dependent upon its species-identity (its being a desk). Aristotle 
concludes, with Plato, that the primary (but not exclusive) aspect of the entity-ness of entities is their 
conceptual determinacy, that is, their universal form.56 It is an ontological deficiency of concrete 
particulars that they are not simply equivalent to their form but require spatiotemporal instantiation in 
matter in order to be actualized as “there,” as a “this-here-now.”  
In the transitional perspective outlined by Heidegger, the determinate and persistent conceptual 
self-identity of my desk in each instance would, however, no longer be seen as the primary and 
predominant feature of its being-there. Account would rather be taken of the full context-specificity that 
makes my desk singularly meaningful to me in each concrete practical situation: it is now a storeroom for 
my books, now a support for my computer, now a surface on which to place my cup of coffee, now a 
concrete example to be used in my work, and so on. The whatness of the desk is, of course, there as a 
constitutive element of permanent identity in each instant of the desk’s presence. If at any moment I ask 
myself what this thing before me is, I already distance myself from my current practical involvement with 
it and the answer will almost inevitably be that it is a desk. But as Plato himself shows in the Republic, the 
“Idea” that guarantees the applicability of the name is, first and foremost, a certain kind of function.57 
The applicability of the name desk obviously depends on whether or not the thing at hand can function 
as a desk. The desk can be painted red and it will still be a desk, but if its legs are cut off, it is no longer 
truly worthy of the name desk, at least in its usual sense.  
Plato, however, does not take the analysis further. He focuses on just one of altogether four 
relevant factors at play here. 
  
1. For Plato, the primary factor involved in the ideal conceptual identity of a thing is, as we saw, 
its functionality. However, this functionality has now turned out to be dependent on three other 
factors. 
2. Another aspect of the meaningful functional presence of my desk is clearly its sheer materiality. 
This materiality is defined by the desk’s material makeup, its implementation, and its current 
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material condition (for example, its being worn down and cluttered with books and papers). 
This materiality delimits its capacity to fulfill its function as my desk. This factor was, to a certain 
extent, recognized already in ancient metaphysics. Plato himself implicitly acknowledges that an 
understanding of what a thing is involves an understanding of what kind of material 
implementation can fulfill its determining function. Aristotle’s basic critique of Plato is that the 
conceptual forms of concrete things, as universal and common to many instances, are not 
substances, that is, not there in their own right, but only insofar as they are materially 
instantiated.58  
3. On a further level, it can be argued that I can encounter my desk as a functioning desk only in 
the context a purposive project involving a desk, such as writing an article or organizing my papers. 
Moreover, such projects are arguably meaningful only with regard to more and more 
comprehensive projects, such as philosophical study and academic scholarship, professionalism 
and intellectual work in general, and so on. The purposes of such projects are ultimately 
dependent upon the comprehensive “purposes of life” that orient me as a member of a specific 
community, in other words, the ultimate ends and aims—if any—orienting all particular projects 
within a given cultural context.  
4. Immediately connected to the previous factor is the historically specific cultural and communal 
dimension that delimits in advance the kinds of projects I am likely to be involved in. It is within 
a particular historical community that certain overarching purposes (such as academic 
scholarship) are shared and certain individual projects (such as writing academic papers) make 
sense. Arguably, something can function as a desk—and consequently be subsumed under the 
concept desk—only in a certain kind of culture that allows certain practices, projects, and ends. 
Nonliterate cultures do not have desks because they have no use for them, lacking the relevant 
practices. 
  
Beyond the dimension that the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition has perceived as alone or primarily 
constitutive of the beingness of my desk—namely, related to the first factor, its whatness—three 
interrelated dimensions of functional meaningfulness can thus be distinguished: its particular materiality, 
the practical context of ends and purposes to which it belongs, and the historical, cultural, and communal 
context within which such practices and projects, as well as their ends, are shared.  
The point of distinguishing these four dimensions is to suggest the following preliminary 
interpretation of the fourfold: 
1. Sky can be understood as the realm of shared and visible openness, of articulated appearing and 
appearance. As the dimension of visibility and articulation, its function is analogous to that of 
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the “formal cause” or conceptual form (eidos, logos) in Aristotelian metaphysics. Heidegger’s sky 
is, however, clearly not the Platonic “heaven”59 of eternally stable Ideas or forms, but rather a 
dynamic historical and cultural sphere of appearing that is constituted only in an interaction with 
the other dimensions.60 An indication of this can be found in Heidegger’s 1957 essay on the 
poet Johann Friedrich Hebel, in which the “sky” in Hebel’s work is interpreted as standing for 
non-sensuous “sense” (Sinn) or “spirit” (Geist). “Sky” intertwines with “earth,” the symbol for 
the “sensuous” (das Sinnliche), to form the “sensuous sense” of (linguistic) meaning.61 
2. The earth, as the counterpart of sky, is the opaque dimension of inarticulate materiality, the 
“ground” or “soil” that grants here-and-now-ness to things. Its function is analogous to the 
Aristotelian “material cause.” Aristotle, however, subordinates matter (hylē) to form as the 
ontological “residue” in things that are not simply identical with their form but require 
spatiotemporal instantiation in order to be actualized. Conversely, Heidegger, in “The Origin of 
the Work of Art,” characterizes the relation between earth and “world” (the historical realm of 
relational meaning comprising aspects of the “sky,” “mortals,” and “divinities”) as “strife” 
(Streit).62 This emphasizes that materiality and articulation are equally primordial and irreducibly 
interdependent aspects.63  
3. The divinities or gods are the orienting dimension of ideals, aims, norms, final purposes, or 
“values.” As the plural form emphasizes, in spite of the analogy they do not simply correspond 
to the Aristotelian God as an absolute “final cause” for all things.64 The Heideggerian gods are 
the gods of a specific people, that is to say, historically and culturally situated ideals and ends. 
4. The mortals, that is, finite and situated humanity, are the dimension of culture and community, 
of historical and cultural facticity, and of communal and linguistic receptivity to shared 
experience with regard for shared ideals and norms.65 This dimension is parallel to the 
Aristotelian “efficient cause,” which Aristotle generally associates with the human being as an 
initiating agent, but first and foremost in the role of a “producer,” as the initiator of a process 
of production or implementation. 
 
4. Conclusion: Singularity and the History of Being 
We have argued that theme of the radical contextuality of being—of the embeddedness of each instance 
of meaningful presence in a multidimensional context of references that makes it meaningful in a unique 
and singular way—runs through Heidegger’s work from his fundamental ontology to his mature thinking 
of Ereignis. We also presented a tentative reading of Heidegger’s fourfold (Geviert) as his most developed 
articulation of this contextuality, building on the incomplete account of the temporal sense of being in 
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Being and Time. The remaining step is to consider the implications of this fourfold contextuality for the 
postmetaphysical approach to being as singular and historically configured.  
When each instance of being is regarded as constituted by all of the four dimensions of the fourfold 
described above, none of which has any independent subsistence but is irreducibly intertwined with the 
other three, it becomes evident that no two instances can be simply “equivalent” to each other in the 
sense of manifesting some homogeneous universal form. Each situation is rather a heterogeneous and 
complicated configuration of multiple dimensions. This singularity of particular constellations of the 
fourfold is indicated by Heidegger’s words: “Each thing arrests [verweilt] the fourfold into an instance of 
the resting [in ein je Weiliges] of the onefold of the world. . . . Only what is compliantly conjoined [gering] 
from a world becomes a thing once [einmal].”66  
What, then, becomes of the persistent identity of meanings that their ideality was supposed to 
guarantee? Here, close attention must be paid to Heidegger’s distinction between two senses of “identity” 
or “sameness”: das Gleiche, “alike,” “equal,” or “equivalent,” and das Selbe, “identical” in the sense of “one 
and the same” or “selfsame.” The former designates a homogeneous unity, a lack of distinction; it 
“constantly moves toward the indifferent [Unterschiedslose],” dispersing differences into “the bleak unity 
of what is one in a merely uniform manner [einförmig].”67 The latter, by contrast, is a heterogeneous and 
complex unity, a “belonging-together of the diverse,” a Heraclitean harmony of the discordant that 
“gathers what is distinct into a primordial unison [Einigkeit].”68 This distinction offers a new point of view 
on the difference between Aristotelian metaphysics and Heideggerian postmetaphysics. It is precisely a 
hallmark of Aristotle’s question concerning being qua being to look for a common denominator, 
something equal and equivalent in all particular beings, some “indifferent oneness.” “Being as such” (to 
on) is shown by Aristotle not to be such a principle; the only common feature that can be discovered in 
all instances of “to be” is their membership in the hierarchy of being, which entails a ubiquitous reference 
to the universally valid, constantly intelligible, and accessible supreme entity as an ideal of perfect being. 
Heidegger’s thinking of being, however, is not a quest for a universally equivalent principle. What is 
“identical” in Heidegger’s sense of “selfsame” in each instance of being, in each meaningful situation, is 
simply the singular situatedness in a meaningful context that differentiates situations. Being is not something 
that precedes individual situations or instants in order to be instantiated in them. Being is, rather, this 
event of instantiation as such, the “employment” of the fourfold context into the one-foldness of a singular 
thing. As Heidegger puts it in Contributions: “The eternal is not the incessant; rather, it is that which can 
withdraw in the instant so as to return once more. That which can return, not as the equal [das Gleiche] but 
as what transforms ever anew, the one-unique [Eine-Einzige], beyng [Seyn], such that in this manifestness 
it is at first not recognized as the selfsame [das Selbe]!”69  
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The contextual singularity of being does not mean that each instant flashes forth once and then 
vanishes into the past without a trace. Nor is it simply retained in the form of a past present. Each instant 
rather dynamically transforms and modifies the “already having been,” the factical background of 
subsequent instants from which their respective futural prospects emerge. It remains as an aspect of the 
tradition that admits of being “repeated,” in Heidegger’s emphatic sense of retrieval (Wiederholung) as a 
transformative reappropriation of a situation that has already been, not as mere reproduction of 
something past.70 To retrieve an instant is to experience it anew in the context of another instant in which 
it will, however, always have a transformed meaning. “Only the singular [das Einmalige] can be re-trieved.”71 It 
is precisely because of its singularity that being can “have” a “history” (Geschichte) in the sense of the series 
of transformative reappropriations of the first, Greek inception of the Western philosophical engagement 
with being and of the different encounters with being made possible by these transformations—a series 
that constitutes the unfolding of Western metaphysics.72 Or rather, “the history of being is being itself 
and only that”73: being is the historical unfolding of meaningfulness in singular situations that are never 
mutually “equivalent” but nevertheless constitute a continuous tradition of retrieval and inheritance. “The 
unity and cohesiveness of history [Geschichte] is determined in terms of the uniqueness of beyng. In 
uniqueness every single thing is in each instance unique and only thus belongs to the One. The essential 
relations to history are grounded not in that which is general in a multiplicity . . . but in the uniqueness 
of the simple.74 
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